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Abstract 
Recent studies of civil war have problematized frameworks that rely on a strict binary between state-
sanctioned order and anarchy. This paper extends these insights and combines them with theories of 
performativity to examine welfare practices during the Syrian conflict (2011-2015).  Specifically, we 
argue that conceptualizing the state as a construct—as an effect of power—can expand the study of civil 
war beyond its quantifiable aspects and embrace the performative dimensions of political life. By means 
of everyday, iterative acts such as welfare provision, competing groups summon the state, and the 
political order it seeks to enshrine into existence: they make it both tangible and thinkable. During civil 
war, the ability to perform these prosaic acts becomes a matter of pressing military and political concern. 
Through close scrutiny of various cases, we dissect the impact of subsidized bread provision by the Assad 
regime, the Free Syrian Army and armed Islamist groups as they struggle to perform the state. Our aim is 
to bring attention to under-studied governance practices so as to analyze the otherwise opaque relations 
between welfare provision, military success and civilian agency during Syria’s civil war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Narratives of Syria’s war emphasize its martial elements. Commentators discuss the 
conflict mainly through the prisms of military strategy, weapons supply, territorial control and 
external alliances. Most accounts choose to privilege bellicose affairs over the humdrum 
concerns of daily life, which are deemed humanitarian issues separate from the violent battles 
and geopolitical struggles said to comprise the ‘actual’ politics of war. This portrayal of conflict 
is illusory: it disregards the majority of interactions that shape both life and politics in 
contemporary war zones, where “most people most of the time are interacting in non-violent 
ways.”1 One result of prevalent depictions of civil war is that civilians are frequently rendered 
powerless. If they do appear, it is as pawns in a conflict fought by armed groups autonomous 
from the societies they struggle to control. In contrast, our analysis sheds light on how 
civilians—through their expectations, demands and actions—shape governance during civil war. 
To do so, we explore one sub-section of the welfare infrastructures operated by the Syrian 
government and various rebel groups: the provision of subsidized bread. Close scrutiny of this 
welfare service, which we conceptualize as crucial to ‘performing the state,’ offers a valuable 
window into military and political developments during the Syrian civil war. It can also help re-
orient the study of conflict towards the lives of those whom it most intimately affects.  
Although force and violence may be essential for any group to gain or maintain control 
over a territory or population, by themselves they are far from sustainable methods to winning 
anything but the shortest of conflicts. Evidence from other cases and close scrutiny of the Syrian 
conflict highlight the importance for belligerents of gaining collaboration, or at least 
acquiescence, from local populations.
2
 This is because discontented civilians pose a number of 
challenges to the calculations of fighting forces. Public opposition to governing entities can be 
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expressed peacefully by way of public protest or noncompliance with directives in the realm of 
taxation, agriculture or conscription, or violently through local militias and collaboration with 
opponents. As competing military groups struggle to achieve support for their cause, the 
provision of services has proven highly critical to building consent and legitimacy amongst local 
populations.
3
 Rebel groups in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Sudan, amongst others, have constructed 
elaborate governance systems aimed at fulfilling the needs of civilians. Throughout Lebanon’s 
civil war (1975-89), various militias stepped in to provide social services to populations under 
their control. These distributive efforts became intimately linked to the militias’ ability to 
maintain control over people and territory for extended periods of time.
4
 By directly providing 
security, electricity, health services and food—or indirectly doing so through access to benefits 
provided by humanitarian organizations
5— rebel groups can engender support and consolidate 
their control amongst the populations over whom they claim sovereignty.
6
 Government 
authorities and occupation forces have also recognized the importance of distributing public 
goods and services during wartime. Attempts to outperform their rivals through the superior 
provision of public services have long been a key element in counter-insurgency strategies.
7
  In 
brief, welfare provision plays crucial political functions amidst the resource scarcities and 
physical insecurities that tend to characterize civil war.  
Why do certain groups invest so much time and effort in providing welfare services to 
civilians under their control while others do not? How do residents exert influence over these 
processes and what bearing do such provisions have on military and political developments? We 
explore these questions through a contextual approach to political analysis that scrutinizes 
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Syria’s ongoing conflict.8 Following Mampilly (2011), we analyze governance during wartime 
as an evolutionary, iterative process whose outcomes cannot be predicted by a single variable or 
predominant factor. The provision of welfare can only be understood in relation to a variety of 
concurrent elements, demands and resources that impact the behavior and decisions of rebel 
organizations, government authorities and civilians.
9
 Crucial among these is the desire and 
ability of competing groups to ‘perform’ like a state, as well as the reception of such practices 
amongst the populations they seek to rule.  
This article begins by discussing predominant approaches to the study of governance 
during civil war before outlining why the provision of basic goods acts as a pivotal element of 
‘state performance.’ We then offer a brief history of food-related welfare programs in Syria, 
focusing on subsidized bread because of its socio-political importance before the war and 
throughout the current conflict.
10
 These first two sections will illuminate the micro-processes 
through which certain welfare programs have become embedded in popular expectations and 
governmental practices so as to contextualize the manifestation of specific provisionary practices 
since late 2011. The article then examines wartime practices of bread provision by the Assad 
regime and various opposition forces before dissecting their multivalent impact on civilian life 
and military developments. While we do not pretend to offer a comprehensive account of 
governance in regime and opposition-held areas, we highlight bread because of its political 
salience. Specifically, this article argues that the provision of welfare to civilians during Syria’s 
civil war has been as crucial to the long-term viability of any military force as its use of violence 
or access to material resources. Indeed, our research suggests that these dynamics are closely 
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inter-twined. We conclude by summarizing the impact of subsidized bread provision on the 
conflict before elaborating on the empirical and theoretical insights of our analysis. 
The full scope of welfare provision in Syria is difficult to assess: the regime and its 
opponents regularly disseminate information, but the accuracy of such material is hard to 
confirm. Drawing on scholarly and personal knowledge of Syria, we attempt to assess wartime 
welfare practices without direct access to the country since 2011, due to security restrictions. 
Between 2013-2015, we conducted seventy-two interviews by email, Skype and telephone with 
civilians in ten of the country’s fourteen governorates. We additionally benefit from a robust 
qualitative sample of respondents collected outside of Syria, which includes 136 interviews with 
Syrian refugees recently arrived in Jordan or Lebanon, many of whom remain in contact with 
relatives in the country and some of whom travel back to Syria regularly. We also draw on open-
source material ranging from NGO and international organizations’ reports to newspapers and 
YouTube videos, as well as information and testimonies provided by activist networks operating 
in the country. To bolster our claims, we supplement our findings with those of various news 
sources. Almost all our informants inside Syria asked to remain anonymous in view of the very 
real personal and professional risks involved in providing information on the sensitive topics we 
discussed. Due to these constraints, we use pseudonyms and anonymous quotes for information 
collected in confidential interviews. Although several lacunae remain and further research is 
needed, this approach can help illuminate understudied governance practices so as to better grasp 
the impact of welfare provision during the Syrian conflict. 
Performing the State: The Importance of Welfare  
 6 
The importance of welfare services and food distribution during war is well borne out by 
the historical record.
11
 Nevertheless, they remain vastly understudied in analyses of 
contemporary conflict, largely because of the assumptions still prevalent in the study of civil 
war. Previously, Hobbesian conceptions of order dominated the literature.
12
 As a result, most 
scholarship deployed theoretical frameworks that embraced a binary between state-sanctioned 
order and anarchy. Over the past five years, an impressive amount of the civil war literature has 
dismantled this paradigm,
13
 demonstrating that although internal warfare may fragment political 
authority, it does not eradicate it altogether.
14
 When the monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
is challenged or ceases to exist, new configurations of political order, and the public services and 
everyday institutional practices these can engender, frequently emerge.
15
 Policy-related accounts 
of the Syrian civil war and our interviews with civilians bolster this claim with regards to this 
specific conflict. Yet the analytical tools needed to dissect such empirical circumstances remain 
underdeveloped.
16
  
The few accounts of wartime contexts that have embraced concepts such as governance 
to capture the broader relationships between rulers and ruled frequently retain an implicit 
attachment to outmoded understandings of the state. The frameworks they employ contain a rigid 
distinction between the state and society, which are depicted as two concrete entities with 
discernible boundaries—a characterization that extends to more recent studies of rebel 
governments.
17
 The empirical challenge of apprehending the state has fostered a form of 
theoretical abstraction that serves to reproduce a conception of the state as a concrete 
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institutionalization of power with faculties that can be operationalized.
18
 State capacity or power 
is then measured according to the ability of official institutions to extract revenue,
19
 provide 
certain services
20
 or deploy coercion.
21
 Although this approach allows for an analysis of the 
provision of public goods, distributive efforts are catalogued simply as observable or quantifiable 
components of state capacity.
22
 Similar assumptions color more recent works analyzing rebel 
governance.
23
   
By ascribing to the state an institutional identity and an assumed coherence, most 
contemporary accounts of civil war obscure the processes through which political authority is 
performed and experienced. In doing so, they lose sight of the micro-practices, symbolic acts and 
everyday techniques that give a governing authority both its institutional appearance and its 
power.
24
 Analyses of civilian life and politics in conflict zones become limited when disregard 
for the diverse nature of ruler-ruled relations combines with this overly top-down and 
institutionalist reading of the state. To avoid these shortcomings, we believe civil war scholars 
must follow their peers in other fields and re-conceptualize the state and rebel governing 
institutions not as a discernible organizational entity or a natural expression of political authority 
but as contingent political constructs—a “structural effect” of power.25 Although variants of this 
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approach have been employed in a host of colonial, postcolonial and post-conflict situations,
26
 
they have been far less influential in the study of civil war.  
To expand the study of governance during wartime beyond its merely quantifiable and 
functionalist aspects, we posit that states do not simply exist, nor are they the stable backdrop to 
political life. Rather, their legitimacy and ability to rule “rely on a capacity to perform their 
power.”27 Thus, the state is represented, reproduced and summoned into existence through 
everyday practices that make it “appear to exist.”28 Drawing on the work of Alex Jeffrey (2013), 
we refer to these practices as “performing the state.” Frequently, these acts are not grandiose, 
lavish or spectacular, but prosaic.
29
 Examples include the policing of borders, the collection of 
taxes and the sanctioning of education textbooks. As Painter argues, these “mundane 
practices” are a crucial element “through which something we label ‘the state’ becomes 
present in everyday life.”30 This article focuses on the production of state effects through the 
provision of welfare services, with particular emphasis on the distribution of food. We do so 
because welfare—defined as the direct distribution or indirect facilitation of services, programs 
and infrastructure intended to promote the wellbeing and security of recipients—helps project an 
image of ‘infrastructural power,’31 which reinforces the omnipresence of governing institutions.32 
Of course, an explicit material exchange is often involved, but the immaterial dimensions of 
welfare are equally important. Through repetition, welfare services help political actors 
foreground their authority within the everyday patterns of social life, making institutions, as well 
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as the authority and sovereignty they seek to consolidate, both tangible and thinkable.
33
 The 
provision of subsidized bread, for example, helps build community; it signals membership in a 
polity, while offering security and psychological comfort to local populations, especially 
amongst the poorest beneficiaries. Assuring basic needs can also foster goodwill, establish a 
reputation for reliability, promote certain visions of group affiliation and political loyalty while 
signaling a desire or capacity to govern successfully on a local or national scale.  
Welfare is certainly not the only means through which military actors perform the state 
during civil war. However, these provisions play an important role, especially during wartime, 
when material resources and security become scarce and the contingent nature of political order 
becomes increasingly overt. In Syria, bread provision is one of the many ways in which 
competing military forces bring political authority into being—an everyday occasion and 
iterative performance that makes their authority and claims to legitimacy palpable to ordinary 
citizens. Such enactments do not occur in a vacuum, but emerge in the wake preexisting 
mechanisms of coercion, moral and political economies and institutional legacies; they are a 
product of iterative social practices that “both presuppose and conjure anew distinct visions of 
community.”34 Put differently, wartime attempts to perform the state, and their reception, are 
shaped not just by available material resources but also by pre-war legacies as well as the 
political rationalities and governmental assemblages in which they are enmeshed.  
Tracing Bread’s Importance 
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Popular protests linked to food shortages have a long history in the Middle East.
35
 World 
War II proved a crucial turning point for food-related provisions and social policy in the region. 
Allied forces could ill afford an expansion of popular unrest that first appeared in Cairo, Beirut 
and Damascus after the onset of conflict in Europe.
36
 To manage the wartime shipping regime 
and the distribution of key subsistence goods, British authorities established the Middle East 
Supply Centre (MESC) in April 1941. This new body organized agricultural production and 
regulated food distribution, undertaking censuses and surveys to guarantee equitable food 
provision throughout the region. Regarding bread specifically, an agency known as the Wheat 
and Cereals Office, working under the auspices of the Spears Mission,
37
 created an integrated 
system of grain collection, transport, processing and distribution.
38
 Through such efforts, the 
Allies and their local partners safeguarded food security, which minimized local unrest and 
fostered social stability.
39
 Ultimately, these and other welfare provisions proved crucial to the 
Allies’ military success in the Levant.40  
The MESC’s incursion marked an important departure from the laissez-faire approach 
that had shaped social policy in Syria before WWII. For example, an array of previously private 
bakeries and flourmills were nationalized so as to produce and distribute bread more effectively 
in large urban centers. Syrian government officials first exposed to interventionist economic 
management techniques under the MESC subsequently integrated a number of analogous 
measures into the post-independence institutional apparatus.
41
 These changes were not simply 
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the product of elite-level dictates—Syrian citizens became co-producers of welfare systems, 
demanding from political authorities similar forms of support to those that had been provided 
during WWII.
42
 Post-independence shifts in food policy succeeded because the emergence of 
interventionist ideas of economic management coincided with consumer protests and appeals.
43
 
Following the Ba‘ath Party’s ascent to power in 1963, the government expanded its involvement 
in food markets as part of a “successful consolidation of a radical populist authoritarian system 
of rule.”44  
Similar to several of its regional counterparts, the Assad-led Ba‘thist regime (1970- ) 
provided various forms of social welfare to the citizenry. These included free healthcare, 
education, subsidized food and utilities. This was part of a tacit social pact famously described 
by Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki as “dimuqratiyyat al-khubz (democracy of bread),” in which 
public goods were provided in exchange for political compliance.
45
 Subsidized bread stood at the 
forefront of these tacit agreements. Since the early 1970s, the Syrian government has supported 
wheat production by subsidizing most agricultural inputs and paying farmers above market value 
for their crops.
46
 The government finances bread consumption by subsidizing retail prices, which 
are set far below production costs. Following Bashar al-Assad’s accession to the presidency in 
2000, there was a decisive turn away from the previously interventionist model of development. 
The young president and his loyal coterie undertook measures that moved Syria towards a 
distorted form of market economy in what amounted to a misshapen process of 
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neoliberalization.
47
 While the proportion of government expenditures allotted to education, 
public employment and pensions were reduced considerably, oil and food subsidies remained 
stable, accounting for nearly 15% of government spending prior to the outbreak of protests in 
2011.
48
 Not incidentally, official institutions controlled all distribution channels of the country’s 
“most important staple food”49 before the current conflict, acting as the exclusive purchaser of 
local wheat and sole flour supplier to bakeries producing subsidized bread. Throughout its long 
tenure, the Assad regime has treated the bread subsidy as an indisputable governmental 
responsibility towards its citizenry, with various notable officials referring to the policy as a “red 
line.”50 Undoubtedly, much of this is due to bread’s nutritional importance: before the war, 
wheat provided approximately 40% of Syrian households’ caloric consumption, mostly in the 
form of bread.
51
 Yet equally important is bread’s symbolic role as one of the government’s few 
remaining commitments to what was once an expansive welfare state, a crucial means through 
which the Assad regime performs the state. 
Since the onset of violence in late 2011, the Syrian government has done its best to 
maintain the bread subsidy in areas it controls by ensuring that bakeries are open, well stocked 
with flour, and consistently distributing the foodstuff.  Interestingly, various opposition groups 
have sought to gain civilian support by mimicking elements of the government’s welfare 
programs. Like the Assad regime, they interact and negotiate with local populations in exchange 
for their loyalty or compliance.
52
 For example, during the first two years of the conflict, activist-
run and democratically elected civilian authorities such as the Transitional Revolutionary 
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Council of Aleppo used donations from Gulf countries to pay for flour and bread distribution 
before funding other projects, such as salaried police.
53
 More recently, after capturing Idlib city 
in 2015, a coalition of Islamist and FSA-affiliated rebels immediately sought to restore the 
provision of baking supplies to civilians after shortages caused by fighting.
54
 Upon taking control 
of Palmyra from government forces in 2015, the Islamic State immediately reopened the city’s 
only remaining bakery and began distributing bread for free, a tactic it has frequently employed 
when it conquers new territories.
55
 Pre-conflict practices and civilian expectations have 
intimately shaped the behavior of both the government and rebel groups. They are crucial factors 
explaining bread provision’s continuing importance.56 At the same time, not every military 
faction deems welfare infrastructures to be worthy of time and effort; service provision is a 
strategic decision based on each group’s respective resources and goals. Throughout the war, the 
Assad regime, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Islamic State (IS) have tended to rely less on 
generating durable institutions or consistent welfare services to perform the state than on 
sporadic demonstrations of their coercive power, especially in contested areas. Bread provision 
remains a notable exception.  
Bread is a Red Line: The Assad Regime’s Wartime Welfare Strategies  
Faced with the private sector’s retreat since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, the 
Syrian government has expanded its role in the lives of civilians under its control.
57
 Central to 
such interventions is the provision of sustenance goods (water, electricity, fuel), including 
subsidized bread. Distribution of the latter has been complicated during the ongoing crisis. Syria 
was self-sufficient in wheat before the war, but over the last four years local production has 
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collapsed. In 2014, the country’s cereal harvest was 50 percent below pre-war levels and wheat 
production was at its lowest in 25 years.
58
 Out of the 140 wheat collection centers in operation 
before the conflict, only 40 remain. Four of the country’s five yeast factories have shut down 
entirely. Damaged wheat silos, destroyed flour mills, poor harvests, transportation impediments 
and military operations have forced the General Establishment for Cereal Processing and Trade 
(HOBOOB)—the agency of the Syrian Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade responsible for 
wheat procurement, flour milling and timely bread provision—to alter its distributive 
strategies.
59
 Additionally, widespread looting coupled with combat-related destruction to 
warehouses has drastically reduced storage capacities.
60
 In 2015, the government claimed to have 
only one million tons of wheat left in storage silos, whereas before the war it kept three million.
61
 
The economic crisis caused by the ongoing war further complicates the accessibility and 
affordability of essential foodstuffs, as general food prices rose by an estimated 131 percent from 
2011 to 2015.
62
 The local currency’s depreciation combined with fuel shortages has made bread 
production increasingly expensive.
63
 Civilians in opposition-controlled territory have been the 
most affected. By March 2015, bread prices in some areas rose by 300 percent on average and up 
to 1000 percent in certain highly contested locales.
64
  
To maintain the bread subsidy amidst rising costs, the Syrian government has turned to 
its foreign backers for help. Since the implementation of economic sanctions in mid-2011, the 
government has been forced to use smaller ships and pay higher prices for the import of 
comparatively small quantities of wheat. Frequently, Lebanese traders act as middlemen in these 
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transactions in order to help conceal the ships’ final destination as larger banks, shipping 
companies and grain traders are wary of the Assad regime’s credit.65 On other occasions, the 
government has used foreign assistance to purchase wheat from local farmers in opposition-
controlled areas by paying higher premiums than private traders or rebel groups.
66
 It has also 
repeatedly used a $3.6 billion credit line furnished by Iran in 2013 to issue commercial tenders, 
not for arms or mercenaries, but for wheat.
67
 Prominent government officials promised to use a 
second $1 billion Iranian credit line issued in 2015 to “secure the flow of essential goods and 
materials.”68 Despite two separate increases in subsidized bread prices in 2014 and 2015 and a 
host of logistical challenges, bread remained readily available in large swathes of territory under 
regime jurisdiction from 2012-2015. Assad’s wartime cabinet was cognizant that a failure in 
food supplies would impact not only the army and important war industries but, crucially, 
civilian morale. “We will always provide the needs to produce bread, which is a red line for the 
Syrian government,” said the Syrian Prime Minister Wael Halqi in 2014.69 Ensuring the 
availability of food at affordable prices, he added, was one of the government’s highest 
priorities.
70
 Less than one year later, Syria’s Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer 
Protection, Hassan Safiyeh, stated that President Assad himself had told him to secure the basic 
necessities of the citizenry “regardless of the circumstances.”71 To meet this objective despite the 
aforementioned challenges, the regime has increased its spending three-fold on the bread subsidy 
since 2012.
72
 By shouldering the costs of this increasingly expensive welfare program and 
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ensuring its timely execution, the Assad regime performs the state, presenting itself as the 
protector of the citizenry and the guarantor of its well-being.  
The Assad regime has consistently used welfare provision to win popular support in areas 
of contested or joint rule. During a 2015 flare-up between government and Kurdish Peoples 
Protection Units [YPG] forces in Al-Hasakah city—the capital of the eponymous province over 
which the two parties jointly rule—the government made a concerted effort to alleviate a bread 
crisis caused by the hostilities.
73
 Amidst the deteriorating security situation in the city, the Assad-
backed municipal administration announced that it would keep bakeries open on weekends to 
satisfy customers’ needs.74 Emphasizing the importance of “providing public services and basic 
needs to citizens in order to overcome the difficult circumstances,” the regime-affiliated 
governor ensured civilians on Syria’s official state news agency that bakeries were running 
smoothly following the government’s delivery of 150 tons of flour to loyal parts of the city.75 In 
response, the YPG set up its own bread distribution apparatus.
76
 “The product of our [bakeries] is 
more desirable than the government bakeries, which are very bad,” said a representative of the 
PYD, the YPG’s political branch.77 By publicizing its distributive efforts while fighting the 
regime, the YPG—which otherwise relied heavily on the Syrian government to provide an array 
of public services in areas it ostensibly controls —sought to demonstrate its ability to provide 
bread without regime assistance.
78
 The race to provide bread in Al-Hasakah underlines a greater 
struggle between the Assad regime, which performs the state so as to signal its continuing power 
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to civilians, and an emergent political group that seeks legitimacy by mimicking such state 
performances.  
The provision of bread to regime-controlled areas has gone hand in hand with targeted 
efforts to deprive rebel groups of the essential foodstuff and, by extension, their ability to 
perform the state.
79
 Since 2012, the regime has bombed nascent opposition-administered 
attempts to provide vital public services and subsistence goods, thereby presenting itself as the 
only viable source of such necessities.
80 
 Bakeries in particular have been systematically targeted. 
In August 2012, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported at least ten government aerial attacks 
over a three-week period on the bakeries of Aleppo, the center of opposition resistance at the 
time.
81
 Another report released in early 2013 independently verified 80 regime attacks on 
bakeries between August 2012 and January 2013.
82
 When the Free Syrian Army and other rebels 
thrived in the regions of Idlib, Homs and Deir e-Zor, bakery bombings quickly followed. One 
former resident of rebel-controlled Aleppo, who had recently fled to Lebanon, highlighted the 
toll of regime tactics, “The regime has made daily life impossible. How can you send your kids 
to school, plan for their future or run your business when you do not know if there will be 
anything to eat the next day?”83 More recently, the regime has shifted its attention to the Islamic 
State’s successful bread-making operation.84 In targeting bakeries, the Assad regime limits the 
ability of opposition parties to execute emblematic state performances. This prevents relations 
between incipient rebel governing bodies and civilians from being formalized or stabilized. At 
the same time, the Assad regime’s provision of basic foodstuffs in territories it controls alleviates 
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economic stress, averts popular unrest and boosts morale amongst weary civilians, while subtly 
reminding them of the benefits of state power and administration.   
Despite the tremendous measures that the Syrian government has undertaken to continue 
subsidizing bread, wartime circumstances have slowly altered its calculus. “We live in 
exceptional circumstances that require exceptional actions and exceptional decisions,” said 
Hassan Safiyeh after the second official government increase in bread prices during early 2015.
85
 
Whereas civilians would likely have contested this measure prior to the war, many in regime-
controlled territories accepted the change without major protest.
86
 Indeed, the large majority of 
our interviewees acknowledged that in comparison to opposition-controlled areas of the country, 
the foodstuff remains both widely available and comparatively cheap. Many respondents spoke 
highly of the government’s continuing efforts to ensure the provision of sustenance goods. For 
example, one resident of Damascus’ Bab Sharqi neighborhood stated: “The regime clearly does 
its best to provide bread. Given the precarious economic situation and the war, we feel the price 
increase is justifiable. Bread is still cheaper than Lebanon or areas under opposition control.”87  
However, there is also evidence that citizens are not unanimously tolerant of all changes to the 
sacrosanct welfare program.
 
One clear example was popular protests in Al-Hasakah and 
Damascus in March 2015 during which citizens denounced declining bread quality.
88
 The rapid 
palliative measures that the regime took to address protestor demands point to the ways in which 
local residents continue to play an active role in ensuring that the government does not renege on 
its perceived responsibilities, even as wartime circumstances alter those obligations.
89
 Welfare 
practices during civil war are hardly static; they respond and react to available resources, civilian 
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demands and political-military calculations. Subsidized bread is part of wider supply chain and 
production process that is not easily sustained, reliant as it is on a rather precise combination of 
water, flour and yeast.
90
 Performing the state is a process continually in motion. 
Underperforming: FSA governance in Aleppo  
Bread provision was crucial to FSA-affiliated rebels’ failure to maintain support in Syrian 
communities. Although military setbacks in 2013 and 2014 turned many against this loose 
amalgamation of fighting battalions, its dismal track record in local administration also played a 
significant role in the FSA’s decline. Throughout 2013, widespread shortages of basic necessities 
in areas under FSA control led to massive price increases and thriving black markets, much to 
the frustration of local residents.
91
 In early January, one couple in Aleppo stated that, “We used 
to live in peace and security until this malicious revolution reached us and the FSA started taking 
bread by force.”92 An activist in Idlib offered similar criticism of the FSA, claiming that “(they) 
did not provide [security, food, water, electricity and medicine] to civilians. They only provided 
support to their soldiers, they weren’t interested in anyone else.”93 FSA-affiliated groups were 
widely accused of capturing wheat silos and selling grains abroad and on black markets rather 
than distributing them amongst the citizenry.
94
 In various interviews, residents of Idlib 
complained of increases in the prices of fuel, flour and other foodstuffs, which they blamed on 
FSA corruption. “They stole our revolution,” said one resident of Aleppo who had fled to Beirut. 
“By taking our bread and making everyday life impossible they lost our support.”95  
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 The link between the FSA’s failure to perform the state and its military collapse is most 
evident in the city of Aleppo. Earlier in the conflict, FSA fighters worked with local coordination 
committees (LCC’s)—democratically elected Syrian National Coalition-affiliated governance 
councils—to supply wheat, flour and other inputs to bakeries, which then produced and sold 
bread at subsidized prices. Through their focus on welfare services and humanitarian assistance, 
LCCs attempted to fill a gap which military forces such as the FSA often could not initially 
address.
96
 In late 2012, a collection of activists and professionals called the Transition 
Revolutionary Council in Aleppo city received $1 million from Qatar, which immediately went 
towards the purchase of wheat to relieve a bread crisis.
97
 This project took precedence over a 
host of other pressing concerns and was described by one interviewee as a “crucial part of the 
FSA’s initial success amongst local residents.”98 Yet over time, the FSA’s failures to distribute 
or facilitate the provision of affordable bread to residents of Aleppo caused many to lose faith in 
the armed group. FSA fighters were known for regularly cutting lines and taking the bulk of 
available food for themselves.
99
 Social media outlets affiliated with Islamist groups published 
statements accusing the FSA of rampant corruption. Simultaneously, they publicized their own 
efforts to efficiently provide basic materials to local communities.
100
 Interviewees regularly cited 
the administrative failures and regular abuse of authority by the FSA as crucial to changes in the 
balance of power in the city. The rebel group was described, “as being unable to establish livable 
spaces,” despite its attempts to incorporate the LCC’s into its governance efforts.101 This story 
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was repeated throughout Syria, as the FSA’s administrative failures demoralized and estranged a 
population initially inclined to support its cause.
102
  
When the FSA’s shortcomings became clear in late 2012 and 2013, Islamist factions 
began to gain a foothold throughout the country, especially in northern Syria. “The so-called 
terrorists are the ones who have been giving us bread and distributing it fairly,” said Tamam 
Hazem, a spokesperson for one of Aleppo’s news centers.103 “[Islamist groups] are offering 
bread to people to obtain their sympathy and respect,” said Jalal al-Khanji, the Aleppo city’s 
local council president in December 2012.
104
 The Islamists proved more effective in both 
governance and battle than the disorganized FSA militias, and were often welcomed by local 
populations.
105
 By mid-2013, various groups had strengthened their control through the efficient 
distribution of public goods: “The new forces understand that we cannot live without bread, they 
use this to their advantage,” a resident of Aleppo stated the time.106 Groups such as Jabhat al-
Nusra and the Islamic State (IS) excelled where the FSA had failed—the provision of food and 
physical security—earning reputations as disciplined and reliable governing authorities.107 These 
efforts were crucial to winning popular support in Aleppo throughout 2013. 
Performing the Islamic State 
While observers attribute much of the Islamic State’s meteoric rise to its string of military 
victories and clever social media tactics, the organization’s efforts to provide bread, security and 
other basic services were crucial to its initial expansion in Syria. One of the organization’s first 
steps upon taking over a town was to control key industries and services related to electricity, 
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water, fuel and bread in order to assert total control over the core needs of the local 
population.
108
 In addition, after IS expelled rival factions from a locality, such as the Liwa Ahrar 
al-Jazira brigade from the eastern border town of Yaroubiya in Al-Hasakah in mid-2013 or the 
Northern Storm battalion from Azaz in Aleppo in late 2013, its administrators subsequently 
lowered the price of bread to undermine support for rival groups.
109
 In the strategically located 
city of Manbij in Aleppo province, IS’s takeover was quickly followed by the establishment of a 
“full-fledged system of governance, impressing city denizens and displaced persons alike.”110 
The group’s effectiveness in resolving disputes and providing services such as sanitation and 
food delivery made it appear as the only alternative to societal collapse. This led many civilians, 
at least initially, to accept the imposition of IS’s despotic measures.111 
As part of its state-building project proclaimed in its well-known slogan baqiya wa 
tatamadad (lasting and expanding), IS published a pamphlet in 2014 outlining the services it 
offers to the province of Aleppo, where it has intermittently governed pockets of territory since 
September 2013.
112
 The publicity pamphlet describes various facets of its administration 
and includes all of the services one might expect from a local government: distribution of water, 
collection of taxes and electricity installation. The document also outlines plans to plant and 
harvest wheat in coming years and underlines the organization’s efforts to “manage bakeries and 
mills to ensure access to bread for all.”113 This was not mere rhetoric. In Deir e-Zor, IS reduced 
the price of bread from 200 to 45 Syrian pounds and made it mandatory for bakeries to offer 
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charitable contributions to the poor after taking over most of the province in 2014.
114
 IS directly 
subsidized the cost of flour, accelerated the opening of bakeries and distributed bread itself when 
necessary, demonstrating a keen focus on “the essential ingredient to gaining popular 
support.”115 In Raqqa, IS did much the same. “Daily life in the city is good,” said Abu al-Bara’a 
al-Furati, a member of the Raqqa Media Center in 2014. “I’ll start with the most important thing 
for us, which is bread—there is a surplus of bread available in the city, more than bakeries 
need.”116 Initially, IS’s model of governance proved successful in many war-ravaged and food 
insecure Syrian towns and villages.
117
 
Since August 2014, a US-led aerial campaign has worked to destroy and undermine the 
organization’s revenue streams in Iraq and Syria, which has had a notable impact on IS’s welfare 
services.  In early 2015, IS raised the price of bread to more than three times its cost prior to its 
takeover of Raqqa, from 4 SP for a single loaf to an “unprecedented” cost of 12.5 SP.118 IS’s 
failure to provide for those living under its authority has weakened its position in many areas it 
controls, leading the group to increasingly rely on force to maintain its hold. Public opinion has 
grown increasingly critical in response. “When it first entered [Deir e-Zor], IS undertook some 
simple works to attract attention and popular support,” said Abu Mujahed a-Sharqiya, a media 
activist in IS-controlled city of al-Mayadin.
119
 “But after it learned about the oil profits in Deir e-
Zor, it became solely interested in running the oil wells and collecting money.” Since late 2014, 
local residents have likewise accused IS of transferring wheat from Deir e-Zor and Raqqa—two 
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areas known for their agricultural fecundity prior to the war—to Iraq, where they sell it to traders 
to fund their military operations instead of supplying local bakeries.
120
  
While bread provision helped IS gain a foothold in opposition-held areas previously 
dominated by other rebel groups, its subsequent inability or unwillingess to continue performing 
the state loosened its hold over several Syrian communities. In Raqqa and Deir e-Zor, IS’s 
failure to provide basic goods has fostered resistance amongst a population increasingly 
unwilling to tolerate its erratic rule.
121
 Popular discontent with the group has helped foster the 
formation of several militia brigades that have conducted clandestine attacks and assassination 
attempts against IS members, suggesting increasing boldness on the part of civilians.
122
 In the 
face of military threats and financial pressures, IS prioritized its military capacity and resources 
at the expense of its previously robust distributive apparatus.
123
 Although the former helped IS 
maintain control in places like Raqqa and Deir e-Zor, there was increasing dissent amongst 
inhabitants living under its control throughout 2015. Ironically, IS has repeated the very same 
FSA mistakes that facilitated its emergence.   
Conclusion  
In Syria, food provision is a politicized landscape. The FSA’s inability to adequately 
supply bread and other basic necessities contributed to its loss of popular support and eventual 
fade into irrelevance in 2013 and 2014, especially in northern Syria.
124
 Where FSA-affiliated 
battalions floundered, hardline Islamist groups such as IS and Jabhat al-Nusra flourished. Not 
only did they offer various welfare services effectively, they were also far more successful in 
publicizing their efforts, which bolstered their image as civilian-conscious rulers. The onset of 
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American-led airstrikes in late 2014 and subsequent financial and military challenges, however, 
has led IS to retract some of its services. IS’s shift away from effective welfare provision, and 
the ensuing loss of local support, suggest both the difficulty of consolidating the infrastructure 
necessary to ‘perform the state’ during conflict, as well as the importance of consistent provision 
in doing so.  Other Syria-based Islamist organizations such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam 
have tried to position themselves between these two poles. Many of these groups have worked 
with, and sometimes pressured, LCCs to bring in international humanitarian aid and provide 
welfare services in a bid to foster support amongst local residents.
125
 Those most adept at these 
undertakings endure as important players on the battlefield. As poverty levels and food insecurity 
increase, civilians have shifted their allegiances to actors best capable of ensuring their basic 
needs.
126
 It is thus no surprise then that the Assad regime has focused on disrupting rebel 
attempts to perform the state.  
Our analysis has attempted to demonstrate the importance of bread provision to the 
Syrian conflict. Although there is no one factor that can singularly explain the emergence, 
development or impact of welfare services during civil war, we have tried to highlight key 
reasons for their importance. Undoubtedly, further research is needed. Yet by conceptualizing 
the state as a construct, an effect of power, partially produced through everyday performances 
such as the distribution of public goods, we believe scholars can better understand the role, 
impact and salience of welfare provision, especially during civil war. Such an approach can also 
help illuminate the otherwise opaque relations between welfare provision, military success and 
civilian agency during civil war.  While the provision of subsistence goods may initially appear 
to be an epiphenomenal component of the Syrian conflict, it has proven critical to its 
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development. That being said, food provision is only one of many intersecting variables that will 
influence the war’s outcome. What we can say with some certainty, based on our admittedly 
brief look into the conflict, is that welfare services are prominent in the calculations of all the 
forces hoping to rule Syria, and that subsidized bread stands at the forefront of these concerns. 
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